Federalism and Foreign Affairs: How to Remedy Violations of the Vienna Convention and Obey the U.S. Constitution, Too by Brook, Joshua A.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 37
2004 
Federalism and Foreign Affairs: How to Remedy Violations of the 
Vienna Convention and Obey the U.S. Constitution, Too 
Joshua A. Brook 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the State and Local 
Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joshua A. Brook, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: How to Remedy Violations of the Vienna Convention 
and Obey the U.S. Constitution, Too, 37 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 573 (2004). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol37/iss2/6 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
FEDERALISM AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS: HOW TO REMEDY
VIOLATIONS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION
AND OBEY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, TOO
Joshua A. Brook*
This Note discusses various ways to bring the United States into better compliance
with the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations The introduction to this
Note discusses how violations of the Vienna Convention are currently treated in
the United States. In particular, the introduction discusses the unsuccessful at-
tempts to prevent the execution of Karl and Walter LaGrand, two German
nationals sentenced to death in Arizona. The LaGrands were convicted after a
violation of their rights under the Vienna Convention because they were not in-
formed without delay of their right to consular notification and assistance. In later
appeals, United States courts refused to review or reconsider the sentence on the ba-
sis of the Vienna Convention violation, because the LaGrands had procedurally
defaulted the claim. The introduction notes that after the death of Karl and Wal-
ter LaGrand, the World Court declared the United States had violated the Vienna
Convention, and that it must allow reconsideration and review of death sentences
in future cases where consular rights have not been given.
Section one of this Note argues that the federal government has the power to force
the States into compliance with the Vienna convention. Subsequent sections of the
Note discuss how various branches of the federal government might attempt to
force the States to comply.
Section two discusses how the judicial branch might seek to enforce the Vienna
Convention upon the states. Section two argues that the United States Courts can
and should employ the World Court's view of the scope of consular rights con-
tained within the Vienna Convention. This section also addresses the thornier
problem of sovereign immunity and argues that the Eleventh Amendment should
not prevent the federal government from enforcing the Vienna Convention, because
the States may not raise the Eleventh Amendment to avoid the effects of a interna-
tional treaty. Section two argues that even if the Eleventh Amendment does apply
to binding international treaties, it does not apply to cases like LaGrand, because
these cases clearly fall into the exception to the Eleventh Amendment established by
Ex Parte Young.
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit; B.A. 1994, Yale University; J.D. 2002, University of Michigan Law School.
During the summer of 2000 the author was an intern at the International Law Commission
of the United Nations and assisted Professor (now Judge) Bruno Simma and the German
legal team with preparations for oral arguments in the LaGrand case. He would again like to
thankJudge Simma for his mentorship and wise counsel. In addition, he would like to thank
Evan Caminker, James Hathaway, Robert A. Katzmann, and Eric Stein for their helpful sug-
gestions. The author dedicates this Note to the memory of Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan.
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Section three discusses whether the executive branch could stay or commute a State
death sentence for a foreign national, on the ground that the sentence was ren-
dered in violation of the Vienna Convention. This section concludes that an
attempt by the executive to delay an execution on these grounds would probably fail
because it would fall outside of the President's authority to see the laws are "faith-
fully executed."
Section four of this Note discusses the power of Congress to enforce the Vienna con-
vention against the States. The primary obstacle to such an attempt would be the
anti-commandeering doctrine of Printz v. United States. This section argues that
the anti-commandeering doctrine does not extend to the treaty power. It goes on to
propose several routes congress could use to ensure compliance with the Vienna
Convention. Congress could enforce the Vienna convention by: using the condi-
tional spending power; expanding federal habeas corpus jurisdiction; creating an
independent federal cause of action for violations of the Vienna convention; ex-
pressly granting the President limited clemency power; or directly pre-empting State
death penalty law with a federal law tracking the Vienna Convention.
[I]f the United States... should fail in its obligation of consu-
lar notification ... an apology would not suffice in cases
where the individuals concerned have been subjected to pro-
longed detention or convicted and sentenced to severe
penalties. In the case of such a conviction and sentence, it
would be incumbent upon the United States to allow the re-
view and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by
taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the
Convention. This obligation can be carried out in various
ways. The choice of means must be left to the United States.'
-International Court ofJustice
"[If] we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to
be in respect to other nations."'
-James Madison
1. Germany v. United States, 2001 I.C.J. 104 (2001) [hereinafter ICJ-LaGrand] at para.
125.
2. Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law', 111 HARV. L. Rav. 1824,
1825 n.4 (1998) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
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INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 2001, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ" or
"World Court") in the Hague handed down its judgment in the
LaGrand case,3 a complex international legal dispute involving the
death penalty, treaty interpretation, criminal procedure, federal-
ism, and remedies for wrongful acts of States. The Court found
that the United States had violated its international treaty obliga-
tions to Germany when agents of the Arizona state government
failed to comply with provisions of the 1963 Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations4 ("VCCR," "Vienna Convention," or "the Con-
vention"). The World Court also ruled that the United States is
under an obligation to remedy such violations, though it left the
means of such remedy to the discretion of the United States.5
When state officials violate an international treaty, two fundamen-
tal principles of American constitutional government collide: the
federal government's power to conduct international relations6
and the limitations on what the federal government can do to
compel the states to implement national policy.' This Note ad-
dresses this tension, and discusses ways for the United States to
implement the World Court's judgment without offending the fed-
eral system provided for in the U.S. Constitution.
Although the LaGrand case eventually came before the world's
highest judicial body, it began as a small-time heist on January 7,
1982, when Karl and Walter LaGrand held up the Valley National
Bank in Marana, Arizona. In the course of the botched holdup, the
brothers stabbed to death Ken Hartsock, the 63-year old bank
8
manager.
Even though they had lived virtually their entire lives in the U.S.,
the LaGrands were German nationals; they were born in West
Germany to a German mother and American fathers, both U.S.
3. ICJ-LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 104.
4. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 71, 34 U.N.T.S.
262.
5. ICJ-LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at para. 125.
6. For a well-documented discussion of the federal government's "vast foreign affairs
power," see Chad Thornberry, Comment, Federalism vs. Foreign Affairs: How the United States
Can Administer Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Within the States, 31
McGEORGE L. REv. 107, 128 n.152-53 and accompanying text (1999).
7. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997).
8. See State v. LaGrand, 733 P.2d 1066 (Ariz. 1987) (affirming the convictions and
death sentences of the LaGrand brothers).
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servicemen. As such, Arizona was required by the Vienna Conven-
tion to inform the brothers without delay of their right to
assistance from the German consulate. 9 However, Arizona officials
did not inform the brothers of this right and the two were subse-
quently tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. The LaGrands
appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which affirmed their con-
victions and sentences.' ° The brothers then filed habeas corpus
petitions with the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona."
The District Court denied the petitions and the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that, because
the LaGrands had not raised the VCCR violation in state proceed-
ings, the rule of procedural default barred them from raising it on
habeas corpus review before the federal courts.
2
9. Id. The relevant portion of the Vienna Convention, Article 36, reads:
COMMUNICATION AND CONTACT WITH NATIONALS OF THE SENDING
STATE
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of
the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State
and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same free-
dom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the
sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without
delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial
or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular
post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded
by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is
in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange
for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a
judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf
of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such ac-
tion.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in confor-
mity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso,
however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.
10. See LaGrand, 733 P.2d at 1073.
11. LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 ESupp. 469 (D. Ariz. 1995).
12. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 E3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Karl LaGrand was executed by lethal injection on February 24,
1999. Then, in an attempt to save Walter, Germany filed a claim
before the World Court only hours before his scheduled execution.
The Court issued a provisional measure calling upon the United
States to "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter La-
Grand is not executed." 3 Germany also filed suit in the U.S.
Supreme Court, appealing for a stay of execution on the basis of
the provisional order of the ICJ.14 In a per curiam opinion, the
Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction:15
First, it appears that the United States has not waived its sov-
ereign immunity. Second, it is doubtful that Art. III, § 2, cl. 2,
provides an anchor for an action to prevent execution of a
German citizen who is not an ambassador or consul.... [A]
foreign government's ability here to assert a claim against a
State is without evident support in the Vienna Convention
and in probable contravention of Eleventh Amendment prin-
ciples .... Given the tardiness of the pleas and the
jurisdictional barriers they implicate, we decline to exercise
. .. . . . 16
our original jurisdiction.
Justice Souter (with Justice Ginsburg) concurred, writing sepa-
rately to note that his decision did not rest on Eleventh
Amendment principles and that he had "taken into consideration
the position of the Solicitor General" that provisional measures of
the ICJ are not binding orders and that the VCCR does not provide
a basis for the relief sought by Germany.17 Justice Breyer (joined by
Justice Stevens) dissented, arguing that the execution should be
stayed so the Court could receive complete briefing on the issues."
13. See Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Germany v. United
States), 1999 LC.J. 9, 38 I.L.M. 308 (1999) (Request for the Indication of Provisional Meas-
ures, Mar. 3, 1999, Gen. List No. 104).
14. Germanyv. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999).
15. Id. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction "[i]n all cases affecting ambassa-
dors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
16. Germany, 526 U.S. at 112.
17. Id. at 112 (SouterJ., concurring in thejudgment).
18. Id. at 113 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("That stay would give us time to consider, after
briefing from all interested parties, the jurisdictional and international legal issues involved,
including further views of the Solicitor General, after time for study and appropriate consul-
tation.").
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Following the Supreme Court's rejection of the stay, Walter La-
Grand was asphyxiated in the Arizona gas chamber as scheduled."
Under domestic law, most legal issues would be mooted by the
deaths of Karl and Walter LaGrand. However, under international
law Germany could still pursue its claim based on the wrong it suf-
fered as a result of the treaty violation. Both Germany and the U.S.
are parties to the Optional Protocol, 20 which gives the ICJ jurisdic-
tion to hear cases "arising out of the interpretation or application
of the [Vienna] Convention."2 ' Germany opted to continue its pur-
suit of the case, in order to protect its citizens from future VCCR
violations and to shine the spotlight on (what it considered to be)
the barbaric practice of capital punishment.
Oral arguments were held in November, 2000, in the Hague.
Germany asked the court, not only to declare that the United
States had violated its obligations under the Vienna Convention,
but also to order the United States to "provide an assurance that it
will not repeat its unlawful acts and that, in any future cases... the
United States will assure in law and practice the effective exercise
of the rights under Article 36. ",22 The United States petitioned the
court to find that there was a VCCR violation, but that the U.S.
apology was a sufficient remedy.
23
On June 27, 2001, the World Court announced two holdings
that are significant for prospective cases of foreign nationals on
death row. First, the Court held that "orders on provisional meas-
ures under Article 41 [of the Statute of the ICJ] have binding
24effect" in international law. Thus, in a case in which the ICJ issues
provisional measures calling on the United States to take all meas-
ures at its disposal to stay the execution of a foreign national, the
United States would be under a legal duty to comply with that or-
der. Second, in a case of a conviction and death sentence tainted
by a VCCR violation, the United States is under an obligation "to
allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sen-
19. German Man is Executed in Arizona 's Gas Chamber; His Brother was put to Death Last
Week for the Same Murder in 1982, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 4, 1991, at A5.
20. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Concerning
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 168, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
21. Id. at art. I.
22. Germany v. United States (LaGrand), Memorial of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, §. II, para 7.02, available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
23. Germany v. United States (LaGrand), Counter-Memorial of the United States of
America, para. 175, available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
24. ICJ-LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at para. 109.
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tence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in
the Convention ''25 thereby avoiding procedural default.
The World Court's judgment defined the scope of America's in-
ternational obligations under the VCCR. However, the Court left
the "choice of means [of compliance].., to the United States., 26
While a state's internal political structure may not be invoked to
evade its obligations under international law,27 the United States
must still find a way to comply with its obligations while respecting
the unique federal structure set forth in the American Constitu-
tion.
This Note sets forth possible ways for the United States to com-
ply with its international obligations under the Vienna Convention
as interpreted by the ICJ in LaGrand, given the constraints that
federalism places on the power of the national government. Part I
argues that the Constitution assigns the federal government the
preeminent position vis-a-vis the states in conducting foreign af-
fairs. Part II considers remedies that could be undertaken by the
judicial branch. Part III discusses possible action by the executive
branch. Part IV considers action by the legislative branch, i.e. what
laws Congress could constitutionally enact to implement LaGrand.
The Note concludes with an assessment of which solution would be
optimal.
I. THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IS PARAMOUNT
IN FOREIGN RELATIONS
A. Writings of the Framers
The Framers of the Constitution took care to preclude the indi-
vidual states from conducting foreign policy, which they rightly saw
as the prerogative of the national government. States are prohib-
28ited from entering into treaties and the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI provides that "[A]l1 treaties made ... shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
25. Id. at 52.
26. Id.
27. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 ("[A] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
to perform a treaty.").
28. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation." U.S. CoNST. art.
I, § 10, cl. 1.
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bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."
2 9
The original Articles of Confederation had no equivalent to the
Supremacy Clause, and many Framers considered the national
government's inability to compel treaty compliance by states to be
a severe defect of the Articles. At the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia, James Madison raised concern about violations of
international law by states:
Will [the Constitution] prevent those violations of the law of
nations & of Treaties which if not prevented must involve us
in the calamities of foreign wars? The tendency of the States
to these violations has been manifested in sundry instances.
The files of Congs. contain complaints already, from almost
every nation with which treaties have been formed.
In The Federalist, John Jay asserted that one advantage of a na-
tional government would be to reduce treaty violations.3'
Alexander Hamilton even argued that the national government
should be supreme in foreign relations lest "an unjust sentence
against a foreigner" imposed by a state court incur retaliation by
the foreigner's home country.1
2
B. The "External Sovereignty "Doctrine of Curtiss-Wright Export
In the classic case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corpora-
tion 3 the Supreme Court differentiated the power of the national
29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Some American officials are not aware of this Constitu-
tional Clause. See, e.g., NPR Morning Edition: International Legal Rights Dispute (Nat'l Pub.
Radio broadcast, Dec. 9, 1998) (quoting then-Governor George W. Bush, saying, "[t]he State
of Texas is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations").
30. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 316 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966) (quoted in Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and
the Treaty Power 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1726, 1728 n.17 (1998)).
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 44 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that
treaty violations "are less to be apprehended under one general government than under
several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the safety of the people").
32. "It is at least problematical whether an unjust sentence against a foreigner ...
would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which violated
the stipulations in a treaty." THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (quoted in Christopher E. van der Waerden, Note, Death and Diplomacy: Paraguay
v. United States and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 45 WAYNE L. REv. 1631, 1656
n.154 (1999)).
33. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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government to conduct international relations from its other
enumerated powers. The Court held that, whereas the powers
enumerated in Article I, § 8, of the Constitution were sovereign
powers originally held by the several states and surrendered, or
delegated, to the national government by ratification of the Consti-
tution, the federal government's powers to conduct international
relations originated elsewhere. "The two classes of powers are dif-
ferent, both in respect of their origin and their nature. 34 Justice
Sutherland found that the powers of "external sovereignty"-i.e.
the power to conduct international relations-passed directly from
the British Crown to the government of the United States. These
were not powers ever held by the individual states and yielded up
to the national government:
[S]ince the states severally never possessed international pow-
ers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass of
state powers but obviously were transmitted to the United
States from some other source. During the Colonial period,
these powers were possessed exclusively by and were entirely
under the control of the Crown.
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colo-
nies acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed
from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colo-
nies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United
States of America.
It results that the investment of the federal government with
the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the
affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare
and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to main-
tain diplomatic relations with over sovereignties, if they had
never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested
in the federal government as necessary concomitants of na-
tionality.
35
Although Justice Sutherland's account of colonial history has been
widely challenged,36 the doctrine remains controlling law.
34. Id. at 315.
35. Id. at 316-18 (internal citations omitted).
36. See, e.g., A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 877, 916 (2000).
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C. Supreme Court Decisions Recognizing Treaties as Supreme Law
Early Supreme Court decisions gave teeth to the Supremacy
Clause by striking down state laws that conflicted with international
treaties of the United States. In its first major treaty decision, the
Supreme Court invalidated a Virginia statute that was at odds with
the Treaty of Paris (by which Great Britain recognized the inde-
pendence of the United States). "[E]very treaty made, by the
authority of the United States, shall be superior to the Constitution
and laws of any individual State.... [The] laws of any of the States,
contrary to a treaty, shall be disregarded.Os
In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,39 the Supreme Court
affirmed the invalidation of a Massachusetts statute that imposed
sanctions against the government of Burma (Myanmar). The Court
found that the state law was preempted by federal legislation au-
thorizing the President to impose sanctions on Burma if certain
criteria were met. "[T]he state Act is at odds with the President's
intended authority to speak for the United States among the
world's nations.... [It] compromise[s] the very capacity of the
President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with
other governments." °4 The Court noted that foreign governments
had filed formal objections with the national government to pro-
41test the state statute.
D. Supreme Court Decisions on the Scope of the Treaty Power
1. Missouri v. Holland Establishes an Expansive Treaty Power-
Under the Constitution, the President has the power "by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided
37. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (striking down a Virginia law that can-
celed debts owed to British subjects).
38. Id. at 237; see also Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879) (holding that state
law limiting the tie period during which aliens could inherit property was invalidated and
superceded by a treaty provision to the contrary).
39. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
40. Id. at 380-81.
41. Id. at 382-83. Dicta in other Supreme Court cases confirm the primacy of the na-
tional government in international relations. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964) ("[R]ules of international law should not be left to divergent ... and paro-
chial state interpretations."); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over
external affairs is not shared by the states; it is vested in the national government exclu-
sively."); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("[I]n respect of our foreign
relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes, the state ... does not exist.").
[VOL. 37:2
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two-thirds of the senators present concur."4 2 In the landmark case
of Missouri v. Holland,43 the Supreme Court ruled that a congres-
sional statute enacted to implement an international treaty did not
violate the Tenth Amendment's reservation to the states or the
people of those "powers not delegated to the United States.
4
Holmes read the Treaty Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and the
Necessary and Proper Clause as together delegating to Congress
the power to enact legislation pursuant to a valid treaty:
[T]he power to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by
Article VI treaties ... are declared the supreme law of the
land. If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the
validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and
proper means to execute the powers of the Government.
45
The power of Congress to implement an international treaty,
therefore, represents a power in addition to the conferrals of
power contained in Article I, § 8. To implement a treaty, Congress
may enact a regulatory scheme that would be beyond the scope of
its legitimate power under the Commerce Clause or the other
enumerated powers.
Holmes was careful to note that the treaty power, like the enu-
merated powers, was not without its limits. For example, the
opinion implies that a treaty contravening an express prohibition
of the Constitution (e.g. a treaty that established a national relig-
ion or conferred titles of nobility) would not be legitimate.4 6
However, Holland holds that the Court should ascertain limits on
the treaty power using a different methodology than is employed
when measuring the scope of the enumerated powers. "We do not
mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making
power; but they must be ascertained in a different way."4 7 Thus, a
statute could be held unconstitutional as beyond the scope of con-
gressional power if enacted under Article I, § 8, while an identical
48
statute would be constitutional if enacted under the treaty power.
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
43. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
45. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
46. "The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in
the Constitution." Id. at 433 (implying that the court would reach a different result if con-
sidering a treaty that did contravene an explicit constitutional prohibition).
47. Id.
48. "It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national
well-being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This is particularly true where the treaty seeks to accomplish an
aim "where the States are individually incompetent to act."49
2. Limits of the Treaty Power-Later case law fleshed out some of
the "qualifications" to the treaty power alluded to by Holmes in
Missouri v. Holland. A treaty may not violate the Bill of Rights, ° or
cede the territory of a state without the state's consent.)' In addi-
tion, many scholars have suggested that a treaty must concern
international matters and may not be a "sham marriage" entered
into solely to enable the national government to enact legislation
that would otherwise be beyond the scope of its Article I, § 8 pow-
52
ers.
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether and how the
"new federalism" of the Rehnquist Court, which limits the power of
the national government vis-t-vis the states, is applicable to the
treaty power. In particular, scholars disagree as to whether the doc-
trine that the federal government may not commandeer state
officials to implement a federal program, as articulated by the
Court in New Yort' 3 and Printz,54 should apply to international trea-
ties."5 Also at issue is whether a treaty can trump the state sovereign
immunity doctrine reinvigorated by Alden v. Maine.56
act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, 'a
power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not to
be found." Id. (internal citation omitted).
49. Id.
50. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that a treaty may not deprive citizens of
the Sixth Amendment right to a trial byjury).
51. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ("It would not be contended that [the
treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the
character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of
the territory of the latter, without its consent." (internal citation omitted.)).
52. Healy, supra note 30, at 1732 n.45-51, and accompanying text.
53. 505 U.S. at 144 (holding that States may not be forced to take title to hazardous
waste because the take title clause exceeded U.S. Const. amend. X restrictions).
54. 521 U.S. at 898.
55. See, e.g., Molora Vadnais, A Diplomatic Morass: An Argument Against Judicial Involve-
ment in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 47 UCLA L. REV. 307, 324
(1999) ("[T]he issue of whether the treaty power is also limited by constitutional provisions
other than the Bill of Rights remains unresolved."); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz
and the Treaty Pozwer, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1318 n.7-8 and accompanying text (1999)
(documenting the disagreement among scholars as to whether the anti-commandeering
principle applies to exercises of the treaty power as well as exercises of the legislative power);
Healy, supra note 30 at 1727, ("Since ... Missouri v. Holland, it has been widely assumed that
the treaty power is not limited by concerns of federalism. Yet in light of the Court's recent
federalism jurisprudence, that assumption may no longer be valid.").
56. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment rendered the states
immune from suit by state employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
[VOL. 37:2
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II. JUDICIAL REMEDIES
Vienna Convention litigation is not new to U.S. domestic
courts. 57 Despite the extensive efforts of the U.S. State Department
to educate state law enforcement officers, the right of defendants
to be informed of the opportunity for consular notification con-
tinues to be widely disregarded. 8 Most courts have imposed a less
stringent remedy for a breach of Article 36 than is required under
international law.59 Part II will discuss the effect domestic courts
should give to the World Court's judgment.
A. The Rulings of the ICJ are not Directly Enforceable in U.S. Courts,
but are Persuasive Authority on Treaty Interpretation.
Some commentators have suggested that ICJ judgments should
be directly enforceable in U.S. domestic courts. Their argument
rests on the ground that Article 94 of the United Nations Charter
states that "Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to
comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in
any case to which it is a party.,60 By signing the Statute of the ICJ,
the United States recognized the World Court "to be orderly and
fair, and not detrimental to the nation's interest.""' Since the,
United Nations Charter, the Vienna Convention, and the Statute of
the ICJ are supreme law according to the Supremacy Clause, some
commentators have suggested that ICJ decisions should be directly
enforceable in U.S. domestic courts.62 However, this view is not
widely accepted for a variety of persuasive reasons.
First, in the only case to consider the question of judicial en-
forcement of the U.N. Charter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
57. See generally Kelly Trainer, Comment, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in
the United States Courts, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 227 (2000).
58. Amnesty International, "Violation of the Rights of Foreign Nationals Under Sen-
tence of Death," Al Index: AMR 51/01/98,Jan. 1998.
59. See generally, Joan Fitzpatrick, The Unreality of International Law in the United States
and the LaGrand Case, 27 YALEJ. INT'L L. 427 (2002).
60. U. N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1.
61. Jehanne E. Henry, Comment, Overcoming Federalism in Internationalized Death Penalty
Cases, 35 TEX. INT'L LJ. 459, 480 (2000).
62. Sanja Djajic, The Effect of International Court ofJustice Decisions on Municipal Courts in
the United States: Breard v. Greene, HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 27, 52-57 (1999).
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D.C. Circuit held that the treaty is non-self executing," and that
compliance with international tribunals presents non-justiciable
questions better resolved by the political branches.
Further, some scholars have argued that the language of the ICJ
statute does not establish enforcement by domestic courts.6 4 Others
have suggested that conferring binding authority on an interna-
tional tribunal would violate the hierarchy of federal courts
established by Article III of the Constitution. 5 In one case, Narenji
v. Civiletti,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
held that an ICJ ruling was preclusive on the question of whether
international law had been violated. Since the LaGrand decision, at
least one U.S. District Court has found the ICJ decision to be bind-
ing on the issue of whether the VCCR creates individual rights.
67
However, the Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled on this
question. In fact, in both Breard and LaGrand, the Court declined
to engage in any discussion of the legal effect of the ICJ order on
provisional measures, preferring to dispose of the cases on other
grounds.
However, if ICJ judgments are not directly enforceable, then
even if a particular fact pattern violates the Vienna Convention for
purposes of international law, that would not necessarily mean a
violation of the Convention for purposes of domestic law. Although
the U.S. is under an international obligation to rectify this situa-
tion, a court might reasonably conclude that it falls to the political
branches to enact legislation enabling courts to reach the desired
result.
Individual defendants seeking to raise claims under the Vienna
Convention face four hurdles: They must raise the issue in a timely
fashion, establish that the treaty establishes individual rights (not
only rights for states party), show that the violation worked preju-
dice, and propose an appropriate remedy.6" Since the LaGrand
63. Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
64. "[I]t seems that ICJ judgments were not intended to be directly enforceable in
domestic courts.... Where the judgments of international tribunals are directly enforceable
domestically, the founding instruments of those tribunals contain express language to that
effect." Weisburd, supra note 36, at 889-90 n.71 (citing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUB-
LIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (5th ed. 1998)).
65. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. CONST. art. III, §. 1. For a comprehensive discussion of why international review of U.S.
domestic courts would violate Article III, see Weisburd, supra note 36, at 891-930.
66. 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
67. United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
68. Trainer, supra note 57, at 231 n.16-19, and accompanying text.
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ruling, a number of foreign nationals sentenced to death have re-
lied on the ICJ decision as a basis for their appeals. So far, however,
no U.S. court has granted relief on this basis, though some judges
have urged deference to the ICJ's interpretation of the Vienna
Convention."
B. The 11th Amendment Should not bar suits by
Foreign States under the Vienna Convention.
The Supreme Court's per curiam opinions in both Breard7° and
LaGrand7' allude to-without ruling on-possible Eleventh Amend-
ment bars to the suits filed by Paraguay and Germany, respectively.
The Eleventh Amendment, ratified in response to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Chisholm v. Georgia,72 provides sovereign immunity
to states against suits filed by "citizens or subjects of any foreign
state."73 The Supreme Court ruled in Ex Parte Young,74 though, that
states did not enjoy immunity from suits seeking to enjoin "continu-
ing violation [s] of federal law.'7 ' Two questions arise in the context
of Vienna Convention litigation: (1) Does the Eleventh Amendment
bar suits by foreign governments to enforce a binding international
treaty? (2) Is the Ex Parte Young exception satisfied in a case of a for-
eign national facing execution?
1. The Eleventh Amendment Should not Bar Suits by Foreign Govern-
ments to Enforce a Binding International Treaty-The Supreme Court
most recently considered the scope of state sovereign immunity in
Alden v. Maine, which held that the federal government could not
compel states to waive their sovereign immunity in their own state
courts, even where enforcement of a federal labor law was at issue.
Although the Court strengthened the concept of state sovereign
immunity, the opinion was careful not to overrule Fitzpatrick v.
69. See, e.g., State v. Issa, 752 N.E.2d 904, 931 (Ohio 2001) (Lundberg Stratton, J., dis-
senting).
70. "The Eleventh Amendment provides a separate reason why Paraguay's suit might
not succeed." Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998) (emphasis added).
71. "[A] foreign government's ability here to assert a claim against a State is without
evident support in the Vienna Convention and in probable contravention of Eleventh
Amendment principles." Germany, 526 U.S. at 112.
72. 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419, 1 L. Ed. 440 (1793).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
74. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
75. Id.
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Bitzer6 which held that Congress, acting pursuant to the authority
conferred on it by Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
could abrogate state sovereign immunity. Taken together, these
cases stand for the proposition that the question of whether Con-
gress may constitutionally abrogate state sovereign immunity rests,
at least in part, on which power Congress invokes. Given this doc-
trine, there are persuasive reasons to conclude that, when acting
under the treaty power, Congress may abrogate state sovereign
immunity.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Alden recognizes that the
Constitution established "a National Government with broad, often
plenary authority over matters within its recognized competence."77
As discussed in Part I, the power to conduct international relations
clearly falls within the "broad, often plenary authority" of the Na-
tional Government.
The Bitzer Court reasoned that in adopting the Fourteenth
Amendment:
[T]he people required the States to surrender a portion of
the sovereignty that had been preserved to them by the origi-
nal Constitution.... When Congress enacts appropriate
legislation to enforce this Amendment ... federal interests
are paramount, and Congress may assert an authority over the
states which would otherwise be unauthorized by the Consti-
tution."'
Since the power to conduct international relations was an attribute
of sovereignty which the states never possessed at all,79 it follows
that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity through an
international treaty or through legislation to enforce a treaty. This
is particularly true if, as with the VCCR, the behavior of state offi-
cials can cause the United States to incur international
responsibility.
2. The Ex Parte Young Exception Should be Deemed to be Satisfied in
Suits to Halt Executions of Foreign Nationals-Even if the Court were
to rule that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity
when acting under the treaty power, a foreign state's petition could
still be granted under the Eleventh Amendment exception estab-
76. 427 U.S. 445, 446 (1976).
77. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
78. Id. at 756 (quoting Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 456).
79. Curtiss-Wright Export, 299 U.S. at 304.
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lished by the Court in Ex Parte Young. The Young exception allows
federal courts to enjoin state officials from violating the Constitu-
tion.S0
In the Breard case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the Young exception did not apply to suits brought by
foreign states under the Vienna Convention. The court reasoned
that the two requirements for overcoming the Eleventh Amend-
ment's grant of state sovereign immunity-that the violation be
"ongoing" and that the relief sought be "prospective"-were not
met.8' This logic is flawed.
If courts were to interpret the Vienna Convention as requiring
the relief ordered by the ICJ in LaGrand-and under the Charming
Betsy canon of interpretation8 2 there would be ample grounds for
doing so-then the violation of the treaty would clearly be "ongo-
ing" until there is reconsideration of the sentence and conviction.
Certainly a petition to downgrade a death sentence to life impris-
onment should be considered a request for "prospective" relief.
III. EXECUTIVE REMEDIES
There is some question as to whether the President may order
state officials to refrain from actions that would put the United
States in breach of an international treaty. Arguably, such an order
would be unconstitutional.
For example, consider this hypothetical: A foreign national is on
death row in one of the states of the United States. He was never
informed by state authorities of his rights under the Vienna Con-
vention and did not contact his consulate until after he had
exhausted state appeals. Therefore, the doctrine of procedural de-
fault prevented him from raising the VCCR violation on his habeas
appeals in the federal courts.
According to the ruling of the ICJ in LaGrand, international law
requires that the United States allow for "review and reconsidera-
tion of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the
80. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 747.
81. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 627-28 (4th Cir. 1998). See also Henry,
supra note 61, at 462.
82. The Charming Betsy canon holds that statutes should be interpreted so as to comply
with international law. Alexander Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64
(1804).
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violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. 's3 The convict's
home government does not question his guilt, but opposes the
death sentence on human rights principles. The convict appeals
for clemency to the state governor, but his petition is denied.
The President issues an order forbidding state officials from go-
ing ahead with the execution and commanding the governor to
commute the sentence to life imprisonment. Invoking the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the state petitions for an injunc-
tion to block enforcement of the President's executive order as
unconstitutional. How should the Court rule?
Several factors weigh in favor of the constitutionality of the
President's executive order. The President is under a constitutional
duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." 4 As a duly
ratified treaty, the Vienna Convention is undoubtedly the "su-
preme law of the land.8 15 Furthermore, as the executive of the
national government, the President enjoys preeminence in con-
ducting the foreign relations of the United States. Executing the
foreign national would put the U.S. in breach of international law,
and expose the United States to adverse diplomatic conse-
quences. 7 In an extreme case, the execution of a foreign national
could even lead to war.
The problem with this argument is that although the President
has a duty to enforce the law, it remains the prerogative of the ju-
diciary to interpret the law. The ICJ has ruled that, in cases where
severe penalties attach, the appropriate remedy for a VCCR viola-
tion is reconsideration of the conviction and sentence. Most U.S.
courts that have considered this issue have declined to order such
a potent remedy.8 U.S. courts may reconsider these rulings in light
of the ICJ's opinion in LaGrand, which is at least persuasive, if not
controlling authority. But they may not.89
Thus, an execution of a foreign national could violate the VCCR
as interpreted by the ICJ, while complying with the VCCR as inter-
83. ICJ-LaGrand, 2001 I.CJ. at para. 125.
84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
85. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
86. See, e.g., American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 2386 (2003); Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
87. An analogous legal situation could result if the governor of New York declined to
honor diplomatic immunity by refusing to release a foreign diplomat jailed for violating a
state law. Here, the President's interest in conducting foreign policy should trump the state's
interest in enforcing its own law-where the law conflicts with a supreme international
treaty.
88. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 59.
89. See, e.g., Issa, 752 N.E.2d at 931.
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preted by the U.S. domestic courts that have jurisdiction over the
defendant. In such cases, the President's authority to see that the
laws are "faithfully executed" would extend only to enforcement of
the law as interpreted by U.S. state and federal courts, not an in-
ternational tribunal.90
Professor Carlos Manuel Vazquez has argued that the Vienna
Convention, the United Nations Charter, and the Statute of the
ICJ-when read together-authorize the President to order com-
pliance with a ruling of the International Court of Justice, if he
determines that compliance would be in the national interest.
91
However, this interpretation has been challenged on the grounds
that there is no express delegation language in any of the texts,
and that such "delegation" would involve both legislative and judi-
cial powers.92
For all these reasons, it is doubtful that an executive order by
the President ordering a stay of execution or commutation of a
death sentence would be deemed constitutional.
IV. LEGISLATION
The United States finds itself in the awkward situation when a
state executive can put the U.S. in breach of an international obli-
gation, even though the decision to incur international
responsibility should properly rest with the national government.
State officials' continuing disregard of the Vienna Convention,
even after LaGrand, has harmed America's relations with other
governments. 93 Given the constitutional uncertainties attendant in
executive and judicial remedies for VCCR violations under current
law, Congress should enact a statute clarifying the status of Article
36 rights, providing for effective remedies where the treaty has
90. See supra Part II. As a practical matter, if the President sought to avoid executions
of foreign nationals whose consular rights had been violated, he could direct the Justice
Department to file amicus briefs urging judges to impose the remedy of new trial and/or
new sentencing phase as required by international law. Since courts tend to defer to the
executive branch's interpretation of international treaties, such amicus briefs would likely be
very influential. See El A] Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167 (1999).
91. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance With ICJ
Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM.J. INT'L L. 683 (1998).
92. Weisburd, supra note 36, at 928-29 (arguing that the U.N. Charter, the ICJ Statute
and the VCCR should be read together as a non-self-executing treaty).
93. See, e.g., Ginger Thompson, An Execution in Texas Strains Ties With Mexico and Others,
N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at A6.
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been breached. Congress has the constitutional power to enact
such legislation under the doctrine announced in Missouri v. Hol-
land. However, since Article 36 effectively commandeers state
officials to implement a federal policy, the anti-commandeering
principle of New York and Printz could pose an obstacle to such leg-
islation.
A. The Anti-Commandeering Principle Should not
Apply to the Treaty Power
Although the question has not yet been resolved by the Supreme
Court, there are several compelling reasons why the anti-
commandeering doctrine should not apply to treaties or legislation
enacted under the treaty power.94
1. Historical Arguments-Since the dawn of the Republic, the
United States has entered into international treaties requiring en-
forcement by state officials.9  Therefore, "either a practice
extending over more than two centuries turns out to have been
forbidden by the Constitution, or Printz's absolute prohibition of
federal imposition of duties on state officials cannot be applied in
the treaty context without modification."
9 6
Language in the two opinions themselves suggest their inappli-
cability to the treaty power. The Printz Court explicitly looked to
historical practice to fill in the gap left by the absence of Constitu-
tional text concerning the permissibility of commandeering.
97
Using this methodology, the Court should have no problem con-
cluding that the anti-commandeering doctrine does not extend to
treaties.
The New York Court expressly referred to incidents of sovereignty
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment." However, the
logical application of the Curtiss-Wright Export doctrine of external
94. See, e.g., Weisburd, supra note 36; Vadnais, supra note 55; Janet R. Carter, Note,
Commandeering Under the Treaty Power 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 598 (2001); Healy, supra note 30;
Christopher E. van der Waerden, supra note 32.
95. "[T]he United States has been entering into treaties imposing duties on state offi-
cials since before Washington was inaugurated." (internal citation omitted). Weisburd, supra
note 36, at 917.
96. Weisburd, supra note 36, at 917.
97. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.
98. "[I]f a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment,
it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress." New York, 505 U.S.
at 156.
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sovereigntym would render any Tenth Amendment rationales impo-
tent. Since the states never possessed external sovereignty, such
power could not have been "reserved" to them by the Tenth
Amendment.
2. Political Safeguards of Federalism-The existence of "political
safeguards" makes federal regulation of states more permissible
under the treaty power.'00 Herbert Wechsler argues that the states'
interests are protected in and by the U.S. Senate because of its ap-
portionment by equal state suffrage."" Since two-thirds of the
Senate is required for treaty ratification, state interests enjoy
greater protection and are given greater consideration in the treaty
ratification process than in the ordinary legislative process. There-
fore, courts should afford greater leverage to the federal
government vis-A-vis the states when acting under the treaty
102power.
3. Only Treaties Can Secure the Benefits of Treaties-In New York and
Printz, the Supreme Court struck down federal regulatory schemes
that commandeered state officials. However, the federal govern-
ment still had various means at its disposal to implement the
regulatory schemes and thereby gain the benefit that the legisla-
tion sought to obtain, i.e. nuclear waste disposal and gun control,
respectively. These means include the financial incentives ap-
proved by the Court in South Dakota v. Dole, 10 preemption under
the Supremacy Clause, or conditional preemption (Congress to
states: enact legislation or be preempted) .4 In addition, states
could choose to regulate themselves and thereby obtain the bene-
fits of well-disposed waste and fewer firearms.
However, such alternatives do not exist in the treaty context.
The advantage to the United States of entering into a treaty is that
foreign governments become bound by commitments that benefit
the United States. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, for exam-
ple, commits foreign governments to afford certain protections
99. See supra Part I.B.
100. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of National Government, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL
LAw 49 (1961)
101. Id. See also Carter, supra note 94, at 606-08.
102. However, the simple elegance of this argument is undermined by the fact that
many political theorists reject Wachsler's thesis, particularly in light of the Seventeenth
Amendment which requires direct election of Senators. Carter, supra note 94, at 607-08
n.52-56 and accompanying text.
103. 483 U.S. 203 (1973).
104. The "alternative means" argument was emphasized by Justice O'Connor in her
concurrence in Printz. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
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and rights to American citizens within their jurisdiction. Of course,
the benefits of the treaty come at a price: namely, the United States
commits itself to affording foreign nationals the same rights. It is
doubtful that other countries would agree to protections for
American citizens if they did not receive reciprocal commitments
from the United States with respect to their own citizens.
Without the power to bind state officials (who, after all, are re-
sponsible for the vast majority of domestic law enforcement), the
United States would be unable to gain commitments from foreign
governments to respect the consular rights of American citizens.
Unless the Court allows Congress to bind states when acting under
the treaty power, Congress would be unable to do so using its ordi-
nary tools. Preemption and conditional preemption would be
precluded by the anti-commandeering doctrine, and Dole financial
incentives could not guarantee compliance by all fifty states, since
some might choose to forgo the funds and the regulatory scheme.
Furthermore, the states themselves are prohibited from entering
into treaty relations with foreign governments.
10 5
Therefore, historical and policy reasons weigh strongly against
extending the anti-commandeering doctrine to the treaty power.
The strongest argument in favor of shielding the treaty power from
the anti-commandeering doctrine is that only treaties can secure
the benefit of treaties. Whereas the federal government can obtain
the benefits of a particular regulatory scheme using a variety of leg-
islative methods, the benefits of treaties-binding foreign
governments-can be secured only through international treaties.
B. Congress has Several Means Available to Bring the U.S. into
Compliance with its International Obligations.
The Executive together with two-thirds of the Senate may, by
ratifying an international treaty, commandeer state officials to en-
force the treaty, as they have with the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. However, state officials frequently disregard
their obligations under Article 36, either willfully or because of ig-
105. See Carter, supra note 94, at 610-11 ("So, while it is possible that domestic matters
will be treated appropriately by the states acting individually, it is impossible that the United
States will be able, through state action, to enter into formal treaty relations guaranteeing
particular conduct from other countries.... This discrepancy cuts in favor of enhancing the
federal government's power to act directly on the states, when the national interest pursued
involves a treaty." ).
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norance. Congress may enforce the treaty and ensure compliance
in the following ways.
1. Congress Could Condition Federal Spending on States' Enacting
Laws to Improve Treaty Compliance-Congress could pressure states to
pass legislation to improve compliance with the Vienna Conven-
tion. The state legislation could take a variety of forms-
incorporating Article 36 into state law, abolishing the death penalty
where a defendant was not informed of his right to consular notifi-
cation, waiving state sovereign immunity for suits by foreign states
to enforce the VCCR, etc.
According to the doctrine announced by the Court in South Da-
kota v. Dole, "Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of
federal funds," albeit within certain limitations.1 °6 Most types of
state legislation proposed would fall well within Congress' condi-
tional spending power.0 7 The sovereign immunity waiver option
has the added virtue (from perspective of law enforcement) of only
leading to review of those cases where the defendant's country is
actually concerned enough to file suit on their national's behalf.
This method of enforcement functions as a good (though imper-
fect) proxy for determining whether the defendant's home country
would have helped in the original trial had the consulate been no-
tified.
2. Congress Could Expand Habeas Jurisdiction to Allow Federal Courts
to Hear Procedurally Defaulted VCCR Claims--One way for Congress
to comply with the requirements of the LaGrand decision' would be
to amend the habeas corpus statute. Habeas corpus allows federal
courts to review state criminal trials to remedy violations of a de-
fendant's federal rights. Currently, habeas corpus has not been an
effective means to challenge VCCR violations because of the rule
of procedural default, and because courts have consistently held
that the consular rights enshrined by the VCCR do not rise to the
level of constitutional rights.08 To implement LaGrand, Congress
106. Dole, 483 U.S. at 203 (holding that the federal government may condition federal
payments to the state on a state's enacting certain laws, in this case a drinking age of 21
years).
107. However, conditioning federal funds on a state's waiver of sovereign immunity
could conceivably overstep the reach of Congress' power to condition spending on state
behavior. "[O]ther constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the condi-
tional grant of federal funds." Id. at 208.
108. LindaJane Springrose, Strangers in a Strange Land, The Rights of Non-Citizens Under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., 185, 191 n.54
(1999). See, e.g., Murphy v. Netherland, 116 E3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997). Some have even
argued that consular rights should be deemed "fundamental rights" implied by the Bill of
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could amend the habeas corpus statute to (1) give federal courts
jurisdiction to hear procedurally defaulted Vienna Convention
claims and (2) empower the district courts to order a new trial or
new sentencing phase where a VCCR violation has occurred. Al-
though as noted, most courts have held that the consular rights
enshrined in the Vienna Convention do not rise to the level of
constitutional rights, Congress has broad discretion to define the
scope of habeas relief available in the federal courts.'0 9 Particularly
in a situation such as this, where Congress would be acting to en-
sure compliance with the treaty obligations of the United States.
3. Congress Could Authorize a Cause of Action to Allow the Justice De-
partment to Bring an Action to Enforce the VCCR Against the States-
This remedy would place with the executive branch, rather than
with state actors, the choice to breach international law. The Presi-
dent would be able to weigh the risks and costs of violating
international law (loss of national prestige, diminished diplomatic
influence, international litigation, retaliation, etc.) against the
costs of not going ahead with the execution (lack of retributive jus-
tice, emotional damage to the victim's family, political costs, etc.).
Because it would still be possible for the President to flout inter-
national law by executing the foreign national, this remedy is
unlikely to please death penalty abolitionists or ardent internation-
alists. However, it is consistent with the American jurisprudential
tradition of deference to the national executive in issues of foreign
policy.
4. Congress Could Preempt State Death Penalty Statutes with a Federal
Statute to Forbid the Death Penalty where the Vienna Convention was Vio-
lated-Acting under the treaty power, Congress could enact
legislation along the following lines: "No foreign national shall be
put to death by the United States or by any State of the United
States, unless, upon arrest, the foreign national was notified with-
out delay of the right of consular notification as required by Article
36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations." Such a stat-
ute would, according to the Supremacy Clause, preempt state
death penalty statutes where they conflicted with the federal stat-
ute. Although enforcing laws and fixing punishments are areas
Rights but it is doubtful the Court would accept this argument given its general retreat from
substantive due process. SeeSpringrose, supra, at 199-203.
109. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) ("[Wle have long recognized that
the power to award the writ [of habeas corpus] by any of the courts of the United States
must be found in the written law, and we have likewise recognized that judgments about the
proper scope of the writ are normally for Congress to make." (internal citation omitted)).
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traditionally reserved to the states, state laws that impede U.S. for-
eign policy may be preempted by federal laws." °
A statute ordering U.S. courts to directly enforce ICJ orders
would raise potential constitutional problems."' But the ICJ's La-
Grand ruling could be incorporated into a federal statute without
any constitutional problem.
5. Congress Could Delegate to the President the Power to Grant Clem-
ency to Foreign Nationals Facing Execution-According to the ancient
common law principle, a crime is an offense against the sovereign,
a "breach of the King's peace." Therefore, the prerogative of par-
don or commutation resides with the sovereign against whom the
offense was committed. In the case of a state crime, the offended
sovereign is the state government, not the national government.
Therefore, under ordinary circumstances the president does not
have the power to grant pardon or clemency to state criminals.' 1
Assuming Congress could outlaw all executions of foreign na-
tionals in cases where the Vienna Convention was violated, as
discussed in the previous section,'"3 Congress could also delegate to
the president the authority to commute death sentences to life im-
prisonment.
CONCLUSION
Because the vast majority of capital prosecutions are undertaken
by state jurisdictions, the situation recurs whereby a foreign na-
tional faces execution by the very state that violated his rights
under the VCCR. Although most domestic courts that have consid-
ered the issue have ruled against ordering a new trial or sentencing
hearing where a conviction is tainted by a VCCR violation, the In-
ternational Court of Justice has ruled that-in death penalty
cases-reconsideration of the conviction and sentence is required
for the United States to avoid international responsibility.
Although the case can be made that the U.N. Charter and the
Statute of the ICJ may require domestic courts to enforce ICJ
judgments, such an interpretation would probably run afoul of the
Constitution's Article III provisions establishing the hierarchy of
110. See Crosly, 530 U.S. at 363.
111. See supra Part I.A.
112. For a history of the pardon power, see Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260-66 (1974).
113. See supra Part IVB.4.
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the federal judiciary. At the very least, however, the LaGrand deci-
sion is very persuasive authority for interpretations of the Vienna
Convention.
The ICJ left the United States broad discretion to comply with
the ruling. Obviously, the chosen means must not violate the U.S.
Constitution. The constitutionality of th enforcement methods by
the judicial & executive branches, discussed in supra Parts II and
III, is plausible but by no means certain.
Because the United States should not be left in the awkward po-
sition of having its compliance with international law determined
by state officials, Congress should act swiftly to enact legislation to
bring the United States into compliance with the judgment of the
ICJ. This legislation could take any of the various forms discussed
in supra Part IV.
I believe the best solution is for Congress to revise the habeas
corpus statute to allow federal courts to review procedurally de-
faulted VCCR claims and order a new trial or new sentencing
phase.
This solution would protect the defendant's Vienna Convention
rights and avoid diplomatic friction. The individual states would
not need to waive their Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity,
nor would the courts have to struggle with this issue. States could
still execute foreign nationals provided states observe the strictures
of the Vienna Convention. Furthermore, the robust remedy of a
new trial or new sentencing phase would provide a strong incentive
for state officials to comply with the consular notification require-
ment of Article 36 at the outset of criminal prosecutions.
Although Karl and Walter LaGrand are now beyond the reach of
earthly justice, the case which bears their name will hopefully
prompt the United States to reform the judicial procedures that
violated their rights-and sealed their fate.
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